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Synopsis 
On June 28, 2012 the custom home of David and Kristina Parks on Autumn 
Lane, in Pocatello, was totally destroyed by the "Charlotte Fire" that also destroyed 65 
other homes. CR 671, 673; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7. The Parks' base coverage under their 
Safeco "Replacement" policy was $371,900. CR 258-259, 262, 264; David Parks Depo. 
Ex. 2, POL 2-3, 6, 8; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2. An "Extended Dwelling Coverage" rider 
increased that base coverage by an additional 25% to $464,875. CR 263,270; David Parks 
Depo. Ex. 2, POL 7 & 14 "Extended Dwelling Coverage"; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2. The base value 
of $371,900 was determined by Safeco, incidental to an annual review process, that 
increased premium and policy renewal just six weeks prior to the May 27th renewal date. 
CR 258-259; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 2-3; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2. 
Safeco refused to pay the Parks the $371,900 insured amount contending 
essentially that the Parks.' insurance policy was only an indemnity policy that the Parks 
first had to borrow or buy - out of their own pocket - another home that, even if much 
smaller and lesser quality, would still set the upper limit of Safeco' s obligation. 
Safeco tendered a check for $169,000 contending that was the fair market 
value of their Autumn Lane home as determined by appraiser Robert Jones. CR 371-393; 
David Parks Depo. Ex. 13 & 14. That lead to seeking legal counsel who, ultimately, got 
Safeco to commit that the Parks could negotiate the lowball $169,000 check without 
prejudice to their coverage rights. CR 399-435; David Parks Depo. Ex. 20 & 21. 
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Safeco then retained Belfor Property Restoration of Boise to make a 
assessment of replacement cost/value of the Parks home. Belfor determined 
that amount to be $440,195.55 (exclusive a/land) or $90.60 per square foot for the 
computed 4,858.28 total square feet. CR 428-429; David Parks Depo. Ex. 21, pp. 25-26. 
Counsel for the Parks made demand for that $440,195.55 pursuant to the 
Safeco policy entitling the Parks to their "direct financial loss" subject only to the limits 
of coverage. CR 444-445; David Parks Depo. Ex. 27. 
Safeco denied payment, contending no obligation to pay until the Parks had 
incurred the additional expense of another home - though the "direct financial loss" 
policy provision did not require such. CR 446-447; David Parks Depo. Ex. 28. Five 
months later the Parks borrowed money to buy a smaller home in Idaho Falls for 
$255,000. 1 CR 459-485; David Parks Depo. E:x. 35. 
The court granted summary judgment for Safeco following a policy payout 
procedure that was not the policy the Parks had. The court essentially ruled that the 
Parks' "New Quality-Plus Policy" policy was only an indemnity policy i1mnunizing 
Safeco from making payment until the Parks had borrowed money to buy a new home. 
The court came to that result by starting with the definition of "replace" despite 
acknowledging "replace" more commonly meant "the equivalent of' rather than "in place 
of' which did not focus on value. CR 1063-1064; Memo. Decision, pp. 10-11 (4-23-15). 
1 That was the portion of the purchase price allocated to the home; the land was $45,000. 
PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL BRIEF - Page 5 
David & Kristina Parks v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois 
The District Court held that the word "incur" or "incurred" in the Safeco 
policy could refer incurring a debt or expense while totally ignoring the more 
common usage - in the insurance context - of "incurring a loss" as happened when the 
Parks' home burned to the ground. CR 1064-1065; Memo. Decision, pp. 11-12 (4-23-15). 
Nature of the Case 
This is an insurance "total" residential fire loss claim under the Plaintiffs 
David and Kristina Parks' "New Quality-Plus Policy" with Safeco. 
Course of Proceedings 
After the party depositions, but hearing Plaintiffs' prior-filed Motion to 
compel discovery from Safeco for withheld discovery, Safeco filed for Summary 
Judgment. The court ultimately ordered the discovery produced, granted a Rule 56(f) 
extension of time, and heard cross motions for summary judgment. The District Court 
granted summary judgment for Safeco, holding (1) There was no obligation to pay the 
Parks the total loss of their home until the Parks had first borrowed the money to buy 
another home, and (2) Safeco had no obligation to pay the Parks the $371,900 amount 
they had insured their home for on Safeco 's specific recommendation, but that Safeco was 
not obligated to pay more than what the Parks had "incurred" to buy a smaller home in 
Idaho Falls for $255,000.2 CR 1054-1072, Memorandum Decision (4-23-15). 
2 The Parks challenged the unfairness of this by comparing it to a policyholder insuring, and 
paying the premium, to insure, an expensive Mercedes, but only purchasing a cheaper Chevrolet after 
Safeco refused to first pay the insured loss. Safeco' s adjuster never responded to that comparison. CR 
459-460 and 654-669; David Parks Depo. Ex. 35 and Safeco Depo. Ex. 6. 
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Plaintiffs then filed this Appeal. CR 1075-1081, 
On June 28, 2012 a fire in the west hills of Pocatello, called the "Charlotte 
Fire'',3 totally destroyed the homes of 66 families. Plaintiffs' David and Kristina Parks' 
home on Autumn Lane was one of the 66. CR 673; Safeco Depo. Ex. p. 4. 
The Parks home was a "custom design and custom built home." CR 529; 
Kristina Parks Depo. 30:19-20. The Autumn Lane area was "above average in condition 
and appeal and at the upper end of the value scale for the city" and had "above average 
views" of the Portneuf Gap Area. CR 671; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7, p. 2. 
The Parks had been insureds of Safeco since at least May of 1994. Each 
year around mid-April, about six weeks before the May 27th renewal date of their 
homeowners policy, Safeco wrote the Parks recommending increased coverage at an 
increased premium. Typically, those Safeco letters advised that policy coverages were 
being increased "based on careful assessment of your home's replacement value" and 
stating what the new "careful assessment" replacement value would be upon renewal. 
CR 654-669; Safeco Depo. Ex. 6. 
"New Quality-Plus Policy" 
Those Safeco-recommended yearly increases brought the Parks' home base 
insured value to $371,900 as of the June 28, 2012 fire. CR 258-259, 262, 264; David 
3 Named after the street where the fire started. 
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Parks Ex. 2, POL 2-3, 6, a. The 2012 renewal policy was labeled a "Safeco New 
Quality-Plus" policy. CR 266; David Parks Depo, Ex. POL 10. That policy had 
"Extended Dwelling Coverage" that increased the Parks' coverage by 25% because the 
Parks had accepted the yearly increased recommended valuation and paid the increased 
• 4 premmm. CR 265, 270, 301; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 9, 14, 45; CR 549-550; 
Safeco Depo. 29:5-30:21. That brought their home coverage to $464,875 ($371,900 x 
1.25) as of May 27, 2012 (the renewal date) and just a month before the June 28, 2012 
"Charlotte fire." CR 258-259, 262, 264; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 2-3, 6, 8; Safeco 
Depo. Ex. 2. This is how the Safeco-recommended annual increased valuations 
progressed from 1994 to 2012: 
Safeco Renewal/Increased Valuation Letters 
Safeco letter 
April 20, 1994 
April 17, 1995 
April 17, 1996 
April 17, 1997 
April 19, 1998 
* * * [1999] 
April l 7, 2000 
* * * [200 l] 
Aprill7,2002 
* * * [2003] 
April 18, 2004 
Old Value 
$172,000 
$177,000 
$195,000 
$198,000 
$203,000 
$212,000 
$218,000 
$221,000 
$299,000 
New Base Coverage 
$177,000 
$195,000 
$198,000 
$203,000 
$210,000 
$218,000 
$221,000 Declarations page 
$223,000 
$310,000 
4 Those Safeco-recommended annual increased valuations are represented in the Safeco policy 
to be the result of, among others, information Safeco had on "your dwelling's features" and "Labor and 
material cost trends for your area supplied to us by recognized residential construction cost specialists" 
with payment of the premium indicating "acceptance of the new amount." CR 616; Safeco Depo. POL 
27. 
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April 17, 2005 $310,000 
April 17, 2006 $326,000 
* * * [2007] $332,000 
* * * [2008] 
May 27,2009 $ 
May 27, 2010 $ 
* * * [2011] $361,900 
April 17, 2012 $368,200 
- CR 654-669; Safeco Depo. Ex. 6. 
Groundless Denials 
$326,000 
$332,000 
$361,900 Declarations 4-19-2009 
$361,900 Declarations 4-18-2010 
$368,200 * * * 
$371,9005 [Fire was 6-28-12] 
Safeco counsel, in the Amended Answer to the Complaint, asserted Safeco 
was "unaware of any such letter"6. But in the Rule 30(b )(6) deposition, Safeco's 
designated representative had to admit those letters were, indeed, well known to Safeco: 
Q. Okay. You know that Safeco routinely sent out letters 
incidental to renewals coming up? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What would it have taken for you to have produced these 
letters in response to our request in terms of where Safeco 
keeps them? 
A. This would have been a request from our underwriting 
department. 
Q. Okay. And they would have those? 
A. Yes. 
- CR 546; Safeco Depo. 14:4-13 
5 That $371,900 base coverage on the Parks "Dwelling" was only a lowest limit base coverage as 
the policy provided "an additional 25% or an additional 50% of your dwelling limit." CR 606, 609-610; 
Safeco Depo. Ex. 2, pp. POL 7, 8 and 14 "Extended Dwelling Coverage". The Parks thus had 
"Dwelling" coverage of $371,900 plus the stated additional 25% to 50% or total dwelling coverage ofup 
to $557,850. This extra coverage of "at least 25%" is admitted. CR 549-550; Safeco Depo. 29:5-
30:21, 
6 That letter is actually considered to be a part of the policy as stated on the cover page Affidavit 
of Patricia Ouellette, the Safeco Archivist who provided the copy of the policy. Safeco defense counsel 
answered the Complaint stating Safeco was "unaware of any such" letter. CR 616; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2, 
POL 27, Section I - "Property Conditions" ,r 2. 
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those 18+ years of dealing and the Safeco-recommended coverage 
increase to $371,900 just before the fire, about a month qfter the fire, Safeco sent 
Plaintiffs a check for only $169,000 with a notation on it "In Payment of: Cov[ erage] A -
Dwelling - Market Value". CR 400; David Parks Depo. Ex. 20, p. 2, Check No. 
8004530 (7-26-12). Less than half of what their base coverage was. 
The $169,000 payment was based on an appraisal by Robert Jones of 
Pocatello who had been retained by Safeco, but "shorted" the true value by only valuing 
1,943 square feet-less than half of the home's actual 4,858.28 total square feet. CR 
Safeco Depo. Ex. 8, p. 25 "Grand Total Areas"; CR 554-555; Safeco Depo. 49:23· 
50:3. 
Further, that Jones appraisal used two-year old 2010 "comparables" rather 
than 2012 values and took those "comparables" from three of six other "tract" houses 
rather than the more exclusive area of Autumn Lane where the Parks lived. - CR 673; 
Safeco Depo. Ex. 7. Safeco admitted that was wrong. CR 563; Safeco Depo. 85:13-19. 
Six "Comparable" homes -Averaging $118.45 and $128.21 per square foot 
The Jones appraisal created a table for three "comparable" out-of-area 
homes with square footage values of $107.94 and $129.07, and $118.36 an average 
of $118.45. The appraisal, however, had pictures and data of three other "comparable" 
homes that were appraised at square footage values of $106.59 and $122.17 and $155.86 
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- an average of $128.21. CR 670-690, 546, 561-563; Safeco 
77: 18-85: 16. 
Ex. 14:18 and 
The Parks disagreed with the low Jones appraisal. CR 553; Safeco Depo. 
44:19-45:5; CR 227 and 232; David Parks Depo. 90:4-16 and 112:1-113:23; CR 528-529; 
Kristina Parks Depo. 29:24-30:25. Because of the $169,000 check notation "In Payment 
of: Cov[ erage J A Dwelling - Market Value" was for less than half of their $371,900 
base coverage, the Parks did not cash the check but sought legal counsel on August 30, 
2012. Plaintiffs' counsel sought Safeco's affirmative statement that the Parks could 
negotiate that check without prejudice to any of their insurance rights. CR 399; David 
Parks Depo. Ex. 20, p. 1. Three weeks later, on September 20, 2012, Safeco finally gave 
the Parks written assurance that the $169,000 check could be negotiated without 
prejudice. CR 401-402; David Parks Depo. Ex. 21. 
Belfor Property Restoration Appraisal - $90.60/square foot 
After that lowball Jones appraisal, and prior to September 20, 2012, Safeco 
retained Belfor Property Restoration of Boise, Idaho to determine the true reconstruction 
replacement cost of the Parks' residence using "equivalent construction." Belfor Property 
Restoration determined the Parks home to have been 4,858.28 square feet and the 
replacement cost with comparable materials to be $440,195.55 exclusive ofland-
$90.60 per square foot. CR 705; Safeco Depo. Ex. 8, p. 25 "Grand Total Areas"; CR 
554-555; Safeco Depo. 49:23-50:3. 
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Despite the gross tactical undervaluing of the Parks home by Safeco 
through the Jones appraisal and the comprehensive accurate and thorough evaluation of 
the Parks loss by Belfor Property Restoration, Safeco still did not pay the Parks for their 
actual loss. 
Safeco's position was that, notwithstanding the insured value on the home, 
Safeco's annual letter increasing coverage to $371,900, and the Belfor Property 
Restoration detailed and accurate appraisal, the Parks could not receive the full insured 
value because they bought a less expensive home in Idaho Falls and Safeco had no 
obligation to pay until the Parks had "incurred" the debt of another home. CR 442-443; 
David Parks Depo. Ex. 26. 
Stated otherwise, Safeco contended the Parks did not have an insurance 
policy but only an indemnity policy requiring them to first "foot" the loss they had 
incurred and then ask for reimbursement. 
The Policy "Loss Settlement"Provisions 
That position of Safeco was wrong. The Parks' Safeco policy is not an 
indemnity policy but provides for "Loss Settlement" and not "debt incurred settlement." 
Two "Loss Settlement" Options 
Under the "Loss Settlement"7 provisions of the policy there are two 
7 It is significant that the policy uses the term "Loss Settlement" rather than "Indemnity" 
settlement. 
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different settlement options. Neither makes a blanket requirement that Parks borrow 
money a different house before being compensated for their insured loss. 8 
first option, is the process the District Court went through - albeit 
erroneously- that limited the Parks recovery to the cost of the smaller Idaho Falls house 
that the Parks borrowed money to purchase. The second option has a more simple 
process; it provides for payment of "the smallest of'' policy limits or "the direct financial 
loss you incur." 9 CR 284; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2. 
The District Court totally ignored the "Direct financial loss" Option 
In granting summary judgment to Safeco, the District Court erred by 
ignoring the second option - "direct financial loss" - though the District Court 
recognized that process as being in the policy. CR 284; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 
28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2; CR 1054-1072, Memorandum Decision (4-23-15). 
Admitted Non-delegable Duty of Good Faith & Fair Dealing 
All of this occurred in the context of Safeco admitting in its Rule 3 O(b )( 6) 
deposition that it had a duty of good faith and fair dealing with the Parks that did not end 
just because a coverage or payment lawsuit is filed: 
8 If "Extended Dwelling Coverage" rights are exercised the damaged house must be rebuilt, but 
that requirement is specifically limited to the bonus 25% coverage and does not apply to the base insured 
coverage of $371,900. Nor were insureds required to rebuild or even purchase another house in order to 
be paid their "direct financial loss you incur" subject only to not exceeding policy limits. 
9 A third "smallest of' factor dealt with "our prorata share" among insurance policies ifthere 
were more than one, but there was not, so the third option did not apply. CR 284; David Parks Depo. 
Ex. 2, POL 28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2. 
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Q. Do you realize that the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
does not end with the filing of a lawsuit or policy coverage or 
resolution? 
MR. ANDERSON: Calls for a legal conclusion. 
THE WITNESS. I do. 
- CR 549; Safeco Depo. 26:1-24 
Similarly, Safeco admitted it could not escape its duty of good faith and fair 
dealing by distancing itself from the lowball $169,000 check sent to the Parks because it 
was based on the low appraisal 10 of Robert Jones - a non-Safeco employee - that 
Safeco hired. CR 670-690; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7. 
Q. That Safeco cannot excuse a failure to deal in good faith 
and with fair dealing by virtue of the conduct of somebody 
they retain; do you understand that? 
A. Yes. 
- CR 566; Safeco Depo. 96:2-96:5 
* * * 
Q. Do you understand that Safeco's duty of good faith and 
fair dealing is a nondelegable duty? 
MR. ANDERSON: Object to the form. 
BY MR. HAWKES: 
Q. Do you know what that means? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That's the answer. Yes. 
Q. That Safeco cannot excuse a failure to deal in good faith 
and with fair dealing by virtue of the conduct of somebody 
they retain; do you understand that? 
A. Yes. 
- CR 566; Safeco Depo. 95:19-96:5 
10 Despite Safeco's known fiduciary duty to the Parks, Safeco gave no guidelines to Mr. Jones 
incidental to his providing the low-ball appraisal. CR 552; Safeco Depo 38:3-8. Mrs. Abendschein 
testified she had asked Mr. Jones to give Safeco "current 2012 values" of the Parks' home "the day 
before the fire" and not 2010 values that Jones used and Safeco was content with. CR 563; Safeco 
Depo 85:13-19. 
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The Appraisal was less than half the house 
Parks' home was a two-level, custom upgraded, home in an exclusive 
area with a sloping view lot of the Portneuf Gap and with a full "Daylight" walkout above 
grade on the lower level. CR 529; Kristina Parks Depo 30:19-21; er 232; David Parks 
112:24-113:1; CR 671; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7. 
In fact, it was undisputably determined to be 4,858.28 square feet with an 
upper main west entrance level and a lower east entrance level that exited through 
separate sliding glass view doors to an easterly view of the "P ortneuf Gap" and 
mountains. CR 671; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7 (Jones appraisal); CR 694-695; Safeco Depo. 
Ex. 8, p. 3, I. 23 (Belfor itemized estimate); CR 529; Kristina Parks Depo 30:16-21; CR 
232; David Parks Depo. 112:24-113:1. 
Admitted Square Footage Was 4,858.28 
Further, the correct square footage of the Parks' home - as set forth in the 
Safeco's own retained expert, Belfor Property Restoration itemization - was admitted in 
the Safeco deposition to be 4,858.28 square feet. CR 705; Safeco Depo. Ex. 8, p. 25 
"Grand Total Areas"; CR 554-555; Safeco Depo. 49:23-50:3. 
Non-comparable "Comparables" 
In addition, the Jones lowball appraisal used out-of-area "comparables" that 
were not "comparable." That was easily discernable to Safeco as it recited that the area 
of the Charlotte fire differed from the recited "comparables" because the Parks home was 
"above average in condition and appeal at the upper end of the value scale for the city." 
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671; Safeco Ex. p. 1. The "comparables were also "tract homes" rather than 
home was. CR Kristina Parks 30:16-25, 
Appraisal used Old Data 
Further, Jones' lowball appraisal used 2010 values rather than appropriate 
and current 2012 values that Safeco had specifically written the Parks about to increase 
their coverage to current levels. CR 673; Safeco Depo. Ex. p. 4. 
Self-imposed Ignorance 
Though those key deficiencies were shown in the Jones lowball appraisal 
and thus "there for the looking," Safeco's designated Rule 30(b)(6) representative and 
primary insurance adjuster with the Parks admitted that she was not aware of these 
serious deficiencies. CR 552; Safeco Depo. 38:20-39:14. 
Q. . .. You knew that the Parks had a home that was two levels 
and was a full walkout basement; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you think in appraisal the value of that house it was 
fair to compare their fair market value by houses in which he 
only considered the above-grade square footage? 
MR. ANDERSON: Object to the form. Lack of foundation 
and assumes facts. 
THE WITNESS: I don't direct or provide any guidelines for 
the appraisal, so 
BY MR.HAWKES: 
Q. You had to decide whether to accept that appraisal; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. That was your judgment call? 
A. We requested that and we accepted it. 
Q. Okay. Who was the "we"? 
A. Safeco. 
- CR 552, Safeco Depo. 39:19-40:12 
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per square foot market value that Jones put on 3 "comparable" 
homes in his appraisal were $107.94 and $129.07 and $118.36 for an average of$118.45 
per square foot. Applied against the admitted 4,858.28 square footage, Safeco accepted 
in Safeco's own retained expert Belfor Property Restoration's assessment that the 
average value of the Parks home was $575,463.26. CR 672, 705; Safeco Depo. Ex. p. 
3; Safeco Depo. Ex. 8, p. 25. 
PLAINTIFFS' ISSUES ON APPEAL 
(a) The District Court erred in not considering the "Direct financial 
loss" provision of the Safeco policy that entitled the Parks to early 
payment. 
(b) The District Court erred in holding that Safeco had no duty to pay 
the Parks for the total fire loss of their home until the Parks had first 
borrowed money to buy a smaller home. 
( c) The District Court erred in holding that the smaller home in Idaho 
Falls that the Parks borrowed money to purchase for $255,000 was 
"the equivalent" of the home Safeco had advised the Parks shortly 
before the fire needed to be insured for no less than $371,900. 
( d) The District Court erred in ignoring material facts that precluded 
summary judgment for Safeco and were relevant to insurance 
industry practices and standardized policies. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Attorney Fees are sought pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-183 9( 1). 
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appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, the Supreme 
Court reviews that decision de novo while applying the same Rule 56 standards. Carnell 
v. Barker Management, 137 Idaho 322, 326, 48 P.3d 651 (2002); McColm-Traska 
138 Idaho 497, 500, 65 P.3d 519 (2003); Cascade Auto Glass, 
Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 662, 115 P.3d 751, 753 
Insurance contracts must be construed according to the entirety and the 
context in which terms occur. Idaho Code §41-1822; Dave's Inc. v. Linford, 153 Idaho 
744, 751, 291 P.3d 427 (2012); North Pac. Ins. Co. v. Mai, 130 Idaho 251, 254-55; 939 
P.2d 570 (1997); Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Id., 138 Idaho 443, 444, 65 P.3d 184 
(2003);Weinstein v. Prudentiallns., 149 Idaho 299, 315, 233 P.3d 1221, (2010). 
In interpreting an insurance policy, the Court construes insurance contracts 
in a light most favorable to the insured and in a manner which will provide full coverage 
for the indicated risks rather than to narrow its protection." Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. 
Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 662-663, 115 P.3d 751 (2005). 
Because insurance policies are not subject to negotiation between the 
parties, ambiguities must be construed most strongly against the insurer. The burden is on 
the insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to restrict the scope of coverage; 
exclusions or provisions not stated with specificity will not be presumed or inferred. 
Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242 (2003). 
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E WERE ENTITLED TO THEI 
LOSS" WAS AT LEAST 
E DETERMINATION $440,1::Jla .. aa 
Two "Loss Settlement" Payment Options 
Under the Parks' Safeco policy there were two "Loss Settlement" processes 
for the Parks to get paid. The first was to determine "the smallest" dollar amount 
between five considerations - subparagraphs (a) through (e) as set forth in the box 
below: 
5. Loss Setuement Covered property losses are settled as foHows: 
a. Replacement Cost Property under Coverage A or Bat replacement costs notinoluding those items 
!isted in 5.b.(2) and (3) below subject to the following: 
(1) We will pay the full cost of repairor replacement, but not exceeding the smallest ofihe following 
a.mounts: · 
(aj the limit of liability under the policy applying to Coverage A or B; 
(b) the replacement costof that part of the damaged building for equivalent construction and 
use on the same premls~s as determined shortly fo!lowing the loss; 
( c) the full amount actually and necessarily f ncu rred to repairor rep lace the dam aged building 
as determined shortly following the loss; 
{d) the direct financial loss you incur; or 
{e) our pro rata share of any loss when divided with any other valid and col!eotib!e insurance 
applying to the covered property at the time of loss. 
(2) When more than one layer of siding or roofing exists for Building Property We Cover, we will 
pay for the replacement of one layer only. The layer to be replaced will be at your option. The 
payment w!II be subject to aH other po/icy condftfons relating to loss payment 
When more than one layerofflnlshedfloorlng exists we will pay for the finish ofonlyone fayer. 
{3) If the cost to repair or replace is $1,000 or more, we will pay the difference between actual cash 
value and replacement cost only when the damaged or destroyed property is repaired or 
rep!aoed. 
- CR 284; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2, ('IT 5.a.(1-3)). 
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second "Loss Settlement" process available to 
process paragraphs above and recover 
loss you incur" as alternatively provided in the "Loss Settlement" provisions in the policy. 
The second process was not subject to any "smallest of' other events, except the limits of 
coverage, or Safeco's prorata liability if the loss was covered by more than one policy. 
(4) You may disregard the replacement cost loss settlement provisions and make claim under 
this policy for loss or damage to buildings on an actual cash value basis but not exceeding 
the smallest of the following amounts: 
(a) the applicable limit of liability; 
(b) the direct financial loss you incur; or 
(c) our pro rata share of any loss when divided with any other valld and collectible insurance 
applying to the covered property at the time of loss .. 
You may st111 make cfalm on a. replacement cost basis by notifying us of your intent to do so 
within 180 days after the date of loss. 
- CR 284; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2, (,I 5.a.(4)). 
That first option was erroneously utilized, and otherwise treated, by the 
District Court as the exclusive method for the Parks to get paid under their Safeco policy; 
it was not the exclusive process to get paid. CR 284; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 28; 
Safeco Depo. Ex. 2; ,r 5. a (1) through (3), p. 12. 
4,858.28 Square Feet at $90.60/square foot= $440,195.55 
That Belfor Property Restoration evaluation determined that there were 
4,858.28 total square feet in the Parks' Autumn Lane home. It further determined that the 
replacement cost was $440,195.55 for those 4,858.28 square feet. That equaled-
$90.60 per square foot. CR 705; Safeco Depo. Ex. 8, "Grand Total Areas" p. CR 554-
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Safeco 49:23-50:3. 
That square determination value of $90.60 by Belfor Property 
Restoration for the Parks' home with 4,858.28 square feet of floor space contrasted with 
the nine "Comparables" in the Jones appraisal where the fair market value averaged 
$122.03 per square foot: 
"Comparable" Homes 
No. 1 
No.2 
No. 3 
No.4 
No. 5 
No. 6 
No. 7 
No. 8 
No. 9 
Total 
Square Foot Value 
$107.9411 
$129.07 
$118.60 
$155.86 
$122.17 
$106.59 
$103.03 
$134.84 
$120.14 
$1,098.24 divided by 9 = $122.03 
- CR 672, 677-678; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7, Jones Appraisal. 
Applying that average $122.03 per square foot, for all nine "Comparables" 
to the admitted 4,858.28 square footage of the Parks home as accepted by Safeco from 
the Belfor Property Restoration determination, the average value of the Parks home 
would be $592,855.91. CR 672; Safeco Depo. Ex. p. 3; CR 705; Safeco Depo. Ex. 8, 
p. 25. 
11 The above stated Jones appraisal "Comps# 1 ($107.94/sq. ft.) and 2 ($129.07/sq. ft.) were 
judged the most representative and similar overall." CR 672; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7, p. 3 under 
"Summary of Sales Comparison Approach." 
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it was beyond reasonable dispute that the Parks' direct financial loss 
was at least equal to the Belfor Property Restoration value of $440,195.55 assessment; it 
was the lowest square foot valuation of the Parks' home when compared to the nine 
"Comparables" in the Jones appraisal. 
Safeco agrees to be bound by the Belfor values 
On October 17, 2012 Safeco was asked if it was "willing to be bound by" 
the "amounts, breakdown, and unit pricing" of the Belfor determination. CR 436; David 
Parks Depo. Ex. 22. It took Safeco five weeks to finally give notice to the Parks. On 
November 24, 2012 Safeco had "approved" the Belfor computations. CR 438-439; David 
Parks Depo. Ex. 23. Safeco reaffirmed, on December 20, 2012, that it had "approved" 
the Belfor computations and was willing to be bound by those determinations. CR 442-
443; David Parks Depo. Ex. 26. 
Formal Demand for "Direct financial Loss" 
Because the Jones appraisal acknowledged that the Parks' home was ma 
higher value area where homes were "above average in condition and appeal at the upper 
end of the value scale for the city" - as contrasted with the "Comparables" he used -
and that market value was greater than replacement value, it was not fairly debatable that 
using the Belfor Property Restoration value of $440,195.55 was the Parks' minimum 
"direct financial loss." CR 671-673; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7 (.Jones Appraisal); CR 705-707; 
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Safeco 8 itemized 
demand" was made on 
Belfor Property Restoration determination of $440,195.55 as the "direct financial loss" of 
the Parks. CR 444-445; David Parks Depo. Ex. 27. Safeco's response was to send two 
letters totally omitting reference to the "direct financial loss you incur" provisions of the 
second option provided in subparagraph (4) of the "Loss Settlement" clause, while 
telling the Parks in both letters that the Parks had to pay their own loss before getting 
reimbursed. CR 446-447 and 450-452; Safeco Depo. Ex. 28 and 31 (letters December 
2012 and 23, 2013). 
Suit was filed thereafter. 
Safeco adheres in deposition to the Belfor computations and value 
After suit was filed, a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Safeco was taken on 
March 6, 2014. In that deposition Safeco was given a further opportunity to back-off or 
disavow the value determinations of Belfor Property Restoration. Safeco's 
representative acknowledged its agreement with all of the "numbers and computations" 
contained in the Belfor Property Restoration determination. CR 564; Safeco Depo. 
89:17-22. 
Safeco's failure to pay that minimum required policy amount was not only a 
breach of contract, but an act of bad faith, and the District Court was in error to not grant 
summary judgment to the Parks for their contractual loss at a minimum. 
PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL BRIEF - Page 23 
David & Kristina Parks v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois 
I 
IVALENT OF" PARKS 
DESTROYED HOME 
WOULD TAKE $440,195.55 TO "REPLACE" 
In granting summary judgement for Safeco, the District looked exclusively 
to just the first option of the "Loss Settlement" provisions in the Parks' policy -
paragraphs 5. a ) (3) to determine "the smallest" dollar amount of a multiple 
steps process. CR 1060-1067, Memorandum Decision, pp. 7-14 (4-23-15); CR 284; David 
Parks Depo. Ex. POL 28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2; 1l' 5. a ) through (3), p. 12. 
The District Court then held that the $255,000 smaller Idaho Falls home 
that the Parks had to borrow money to buy on December 6, 2012 -was "the equivalent 
of' their totally-destroyed home. It was undisputedly not "the equivalent" of what the 
Parks lost; Safeco agreed it would cost $440,195.55 to replace the Parks' home. And the 
Jones' appraisal put market values above replacement cost. CR. 1060-1067, 
Memorandum Decision, pp. 7-14 (4-23-15). 
The District Court's erroneous process started by addressing the words 
"repair or replace the damaged building" in the policy for purposes of detennining "the 
smallest of' the four itemized categories. CR. 1060-1067, Memorandum Decision, pp. 7-
14 (4-23-15). 
Plaintiffs' position, as acknowledged by the District Court, was that 
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"buying a home Idaho Falls does not constitute repairing or replacing the home that 
was totally lost under subsection ( c )" because "the damaged building was not repaired or 
replaced" when reading the language of the policy construed most favorably to the Parks. 
CR 1063; Memorandum Decision, p. 10 (4-23-15). 
The court agreed that "repair" did not apply because the Parks' "house was 
completely destroyed in the fire." CR 1063; Memorandum Decision, p. 10 (4-23-15). 
The court then undertook to determine whether the "completely destroyed" 
home was "replaced" under rules applicable to insurance policies. CR 1063; 
Memorandum Decision, p. 1 o (4-23-15). The Parks' position was that the home was not 
"replaced" by buying a smaller home in Idaho Falls because the Idaho Falls home did not 
"restore" them to their "former condition", or give them "the like", as the term is most 
commonly used and defined by Webster's Dictionary. CR 1063; Memorandum Decision, 
p. 10 (4-23-15). 
The District Court then set forth the following definitions of "replace" from 
Webster's Dictionary: 
1. To place again; to restore to a former place, 12 position, 
condition, or the like. 
2. To refund; to repay; to restore. 
3. To supply or substitute an equivalent for. 
4. To take the place of; to supply the want of. 
5. To put in a new or different place. 
CR 1063; Memorandum Decision, p. 10 (4-23-15). 
12 All italics and bold herein are added unless stated otherwise. 
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While it is true that the Idaho Falls home "took the place of' their fonner 
as a hotel room or a cheap apartment would have become new ~"'··~~ 
it certainly was not the "equivalent for" or "the like" of their Pocatello home, nor did 
it "restore" to the Parks what they had lost and paid Safeco a premium to get the 
"equivalent" of. 
Entitled to the "Equivalent" of what they lost 
On the next half a page of his Memorandum Decision, the District Court 
referred five times to the Parks being entitled to "an equivalent for" what they lost, while 
stating that the five enumerated definitions by Webster's of "replace" were "not in 
conflict with one another." CR 1064; Memorandum Decision, p. 11 (4-23-15). The 
Court then, for the sixth time, stated that the Parks were entitled to the "equivalent" of 
what they lost: 
Within the context of the Replacement Cost provision, all 
interpretations of "replace" as used in the Policy plainly 
provide that Defendant has three options to "supply or 
substitute an equivalent for" Plaintiffs1 destroyed home. 
- CR 1064; Memorandum Decision, p. 11 (4-23-15) 
The District Court then essentially ignored what it had just concluded by 
stating that the $255,000 the Parks paid for the Idaho Falls home was "the amount 
actually incurred to repair or replace" the Parks' Pocatello home. CR 1066; 
Memorandum Decision, p. 13 (4-23-15). 
To the extent that there were competing definitions of "replace" for which 
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the majority of the definitions meant "the equivalent of' or "the like" as contrasted with 
contrasting minority definition "To put in a new or different the 
Court erred in not holding that the Parks were entitled to "the equivalent" of what they 
lost. Further, the law is clear that when interpreting an insurance policy, the Court 
construes insurance contracts in a light most favorable to the insured and in a manner 
which will provide full coverage for the indicated risks rather than to narrow its 
protection." Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 
662-663, 115 P.3d 751 (2005). Additionally, because insurance policies are contracts of 
adhesion, not subject to negotiation between the parties, ambiguities must be construed 
most strongly against the insurer. The burden is on the insurer to use clear and precise 
language if it wishes to restrict the scope of coverage; exclusions or provisions not stated 
with specificity will not be presumed or inferred. Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. 
Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242, 245 (2003). 
The cheaper Idaho Falls home was not "the equivalent" of the Pocatello home 
Additionally, the District Court jumped to that erroneous fact and legal 
conclusion without ever addressing head-on the fact issue of whether the Idaho Falls 
home was indeed "the equivalent" of the home the Parks lost. It was not, and the District 
Court erred in so concluding; $255,000 was not the "equivalent" of the $371,900. 
Safeco's renewal letter stated was the home replacement cost of $440,195.55 as 
detennined by Safeco through its chosen expert Belfor Property Restoration. 
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Further, Safeco never contended, in any of its communications or filings, 
that the much cheaper Idaho Falls home was "the equivalent" of the Parks' Pocatello 
home that Safeco had advised should be insured for no less than $371,900 as of the June 
28, 2012 fire. POL 6, 8. That June 2th letter is part of the Safeco policy to the 
extent it contradicts the printed provisions of the policy. 13 See policy cover page affidavit 
of Patricia Ouellette, POL 1. CR 257-259, 262, 264; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 1-3, 
8; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2. 
The District Court failed to follow the law in only looking at one portion of 
the Safeco policy and requiring the Parks to first "pay their own loss" before receiving 
any insurance payment. 
POINT THREE 
WAS NOT APPLY A DEFINITION OF "INCUR" 
WAS REASONABLE AND MORE FAVORABLE 
TH INSUREDS, PARKS 
In granting summary judgment for Safeco, the District Court recognized 
the correct rules that differing interpretations of language present questions of fact and, 
as between policy language reasonably susceptible to different meanings, the definition 
13 Separate correspondence can become part of the policy. See, Farmers Insurance 
Company of Idaho v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428,432, 987 P.2d 1043 (1999)(The district court 
concluded that the 'Dear Policyholder' language was part of the UIM endorsement which conflicted with 
the limitation of liability and setoff provisions, thus, making the endorsement ambiguous). 
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usage most favorable to the insured must be used: 
the is reasonably subject to differing 
interpretations, language is ambiguous and its meaning is 
a question of fact. }vfoss v. }!lid-America Fire and Marine Ins. 
Co., 103 Idaho 298, 300, 647 P.2d 754, 756 (1982). 
- CR 1057-1058; Memorandum 
* * * 
pp. 4.5 
An insurance policy provision is ambiguous if "it is 
reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations." 
5) 
[ referencing fn 18 and citing Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. 
Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d 
751, 754 (2005)] 
* * * 
If a policy is found to be ambiguous, then its interpretation is 
a question of fact and any ambiguities in the policy must be 
construed against the insurer. [ referencing fn 19 and citing 
Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 
Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d 751, 754 (2005)] 
- CR 1059; Memorandum Decision, pp. 6 (4-23-15) 
However, the District Court failed to follow those basic rules which 
resulted in the consequence or essentially writing-out of the Parks' policy the very 
essence of "insurance." 
The District Court ignores meaning of "Incurring a loss" 
Further, the reversible error was in interpreting the word "incurred" to 
exclusively mean to incur a debt or expense while ignoring the more common usage m 
the insurance context of- "to incur a loss." 
Thus, using only the definition of "incurring a debt", the Court held that the 
Parks were required to "incur a debt or expense" in borrowing the money to buy another 
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house before they were entitled to be paid anything under Safeco insurance policy. 14 
Safeco essentially persuaded the Court to say to the Parks -We don't 
have to pay you for your totally-destroyed house until you first borrow the money -
incur a debt to buy another one. And if you just happen to be short of money so you 
have to buy a smaller house than you lose, sorry. - 15 
The issue was well framed: 
Second, Plaintiffs argue it is not a reasonable reading of the 
Policy that they are required to "incur" out-of-pocket 
expenses in order to collect on their loss. Plaintiffs claim that 
the definition of "incurred" should include the incurrence of 
repair estimates, like the one Belfor performed. 
- CR 1064; Memorandum Decision, p. 11 (4-23-15) 
The foregoing did not reflect the interchange between Plaintiffs' counsel 
and the Court during oral argument that the Safeco policy had nothing stating that the 
Parks had to incur a debt or new expense in order to collect under the Safeco policy. 
Counsel explained by the example of "if my car is stolen .. .I have incurred a loss." The 
Court even agreed that was a reasonable use of the word that would not limit its usage to 
14 Additionally, Plaintiffs argue it is not a reasonable interpretation of the Policy that they 
were required to "incur" expenses to rebuild before receiving coverage. CR 1059; Memorandum 
Decision, p. 6 (4-23-15). 
15 Indeed, that is the only reasonable reading of the incuned requirement, because it would not 
likely be possible for the insured to actually pay the full repair estimate shortly following the loss; the 
very purpose of insurance is to avoid that very thing. Further, defining "incurred" as including a repair 
estimate, such as the detailed one performed by Belfor Property Restoration, is consistent with the Safeco 
policy definition of "Replacement cost." CR 950; Miller Declaration, ,r14. 
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incurring new debt: 
Now, in the deposition, Rob Anderson made a 
big deal that because they hadn't gone out and bought 
anything, that they hadn't incurred a loss. 
Court: Right. 
Hawkes: Garbage. 
The Court: Why? 
Hawkes: When that house burned to the ground, they 
lost it. There is only one portion of this page 28 that uses the 
word "incurred," and it is not in the last portion that I pointed 
out to you. 
The Court: Well, it's listed under 4(b ), the direct financial 
loss you incurred. 
Mr. Hawkes: Yeah, yeah. Does that mean does that mean 
to the average person that you don't have any insurance at all 
so you go get a loan and build that house? It obviously 
doesn't mean that. 
The Court: Why does it not mean that? That's been a debate 
that's been going on in the Idaho courts for decades, as to 
whether or not you have to go out and actually replace it 
before you get paid. That's been a provision in so many 
cases. That discussion has been going on for a very long 
time. 
Mr. Hawkes: Then you have to you have to have a 
definition of "incur" in this policy that says you have to spend 
the money first before we have to pay you a nickel. And the 
policy doesn't say that. How else would you describe, if my 
car is stolen ... 
The Court: Right. 
Mr. Hawkes: .. .I've incurred a loss. I've incurred a loss 
when it's gone. Isn't that the plain meaning of the word 
"incur"? 
The Court: It's possible, I suppose. That's what your 
argument is okay. 
Mr. Hawkes: I'm saying when I paid a premium for a house 
to protect it against a fire, and when that fire bums that to the 
ground, I have incurred the loss for which I paid the premium 
that they agreed to insure. The fact that I - the fact that they 
want to argue I haven't incurred a loss because I haven't then 
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in addition to the insurance gone out and borrowed money, I 
think is foolish. And I don't thing it's a fair reading. 
I think of that being an ambiguity. I think the 
common meaning of the word is an event has happened, 
a loss. I now 
gone. 
Court: Okay. And what is your loss? 
Hawkes: My loss is what all of agree I had or what I 
would get under a replacement policy for what burned down. 
And that's where Belfour comes in. 
The Court: And so your position basically is if I pay a 
premium for a Mercedes, I get a Mercedes. Ifmy Mercedes 
gets crushed or stolen, I get a Mercedes no matter what, even 
though I replace it with a Chevrolet. 
Mr. Hawkes: Yes. The twist is you don't get a car if you 
paid for a house. 
The Court: I know. The analysis is simple. 
- Hearing Transcript 24:13-26:19 (May 27, 2014)(ea) 
Though it would seem most basic as to any purchase of insurance, 
Plaintiffs' briefing pointed out that, 
"the policy did not require that the Parks 'incur' expense to 
rebuild before their would have coverage under the Policy." 
- CR 1038; Plaintiffs' Reply Memo, p. 1 (2-17-15) 
Plaintiffs' briefing also pointed out that, 
There is no requirement that the Parks pay their loss out-of-
pocket before Defendant must pay under the Policy. Such is 
not even "insurance." Defendant dismisses this by stating 
that whether the Parks were required to "incur" additional 
expense is "speculative" because the Plaintiffs never elected 
to "rebuild their house." - CR 1010, Safeco Opposing 
Memo,. p. 18 (2-6-15); CR 1048; Plaintiffs' Reply Memo, p. 
11 7-15) 
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defining "incurred" so as to require a loan, the agam 
erred in selecting, between two reasonable choices, a definition that most favored the 
msurer. The Court applied the law backwards. Here is how that played out: 
The Court chose the 2014 Black's Law Dictionary definition of"incur" as 
"to suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or expense)." CR 1065; Memorandum Decision, 
p. 12 (4-23-15). And the Court looked no further, even erroneously stating that the 
Plaintiffs had not proffered any "conflicting definition" to consider: 
In fact, Plaintiff[sic] has not proffered a conflicting 
definition of incur, but simply asserted the definition should 
include incurred repair estimates. 
- CR 1065; Memorandum Decision, p. 12. 5) 
The District Court erred in stating that it was the Plaintiff that did not 
proffer a conflicting definition of incur. It was the Defendant who did not! See Safeco's 
CR 1010-1011, Safeco Opposing Memo)' heading C. "Incurring Additional Expense" pp. 
18-19 (2-6-15). 
Mr. Parks had testified in his deposition that the word "incurred" to him 
meant that "it occurs." 16 CR 225; David Parks Depo 83:13-15. 
"Incurred" as used in the Insurance Industry includes the event of "a Loss" 
Further, Charles Miller, Plaintiffs insurance industry expert, had provided 
a Declaration setting forth the expert fact information that the word "incurred" in the 
insurance industry had a meaning that was synonymous with a loss being incurred and 
16 Mr. Parks was right. Both "incur" and "occur" have the same Latin root and are synonyms. 
Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com/view/Entry/94140 cfwww.oed.com/view/Entry/130192. 
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amount of that loss being evidenced by an appraisal or estimate: 17 
Safeco's obligation to the Parks was to pay replacement 
as limited to what the Parks incurred loss was ( or the 
insured's "financial loss") within a short time following the 
loss. The word "incurred" is not defined in the Safeco policy; 
pursuant to insurance industry standards for the 
interpretation of insurance policies it should be read to 
include repair estimates, which have not been paid. Indeed, 
that is the only reasonable reading of the incurred 
requirement, because it would not likely be possible for the 
insured to actually pay the full repair estimate shortly after 
the loss; the very purpose of insurance is to avoid that very 
thing. Further, defining "incurred" as including a repair 
estimate, such as the detailed one perfonned by Belfor 
Property Restoration, is consistent with the Safeco policy 
definition of "Replacement cost." 
* * * 
15. Most importantly, Safeco did not require that the Parks 
incur anything before it paid the original $169,000 amount 
based on the Jones appraisal. Safeco' s argument now 
asserting that the Parks were required to "incur" a further 
loss 18 before Safeco was obligated to make full payment turns 
the very purpose of insurance on its head by requiring an 
insured to first pay for the very loss sustained and insured 
against before receiving payment from the insurer. That is 
contrary to the policy, Safeco's annual representations to the 
Parks, Safeco's conduct here and any insured's reasonable 
expectations in the same circumstances. 
- CR 943, Mmer Declaration, 1114 & 15 (ea) 
17 Safeco proffered no expert to contest this proffered fact that "incurred" as used within the 
insurance industry included the meaning of incurring a loss. Mr. Miller's fact information was not 
challenged. It was, however, totally disregarded by the District Court. 
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Further, the Court's approach to the definition of "incur" ignored the 
use of "incur" in the sense of a loss as contained the policy itself 
• the direct financial loss you incur; POL 
• (b) the direct financial loss you incur; POL 
- CR David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2. 
Safeco's position to the District Court 
Safeco's argument in summary judgment briefing was that the Parks were 
required to become indebted or spend money on their loss before Safeco had any 
obligation to pay under the policy: 
• "Safeco would pay the full amount it cost to replace the dwelling when 
the Parks incurred-i.e., paid the cost of such replacement." 
- CR 1 Safeco Memo Supporting Summary Judgment, p. 7 (4-11-14) 
• "Parks would have to actually spend something." 
- CR 181, Safeco Memo Supporting Summary p. 9 (4-11-1 
• Plaintiffs had not spent $440)95.55; "he and his wife had not incurred 
$440,195.55 in costs" CR 182, Safeco Memo Supporting Summary 
Judgment, p. 10 (4-11-14}; 
• "The Parks did not incur any rebuilding costs * * * They never paid 
Belfor any amount" CR 182, Safeco Memo Supporting Summary 
Judgment, p. 10 (4-11-14); 
• "Plaintiffs had not incurred any amount beyond the price of the Idaho 
Falls home" CR 184, Safeco Memo Supporting Summary Judgment, p. 12 
1-14); 
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was error for District Court, the process to 
limit its plain meaning to solely incurring a debt or expense. The words incur and 
incurred are just as commonly used to describe an injury or damage inflicted upon a 
person or their property. Specifically, what the District Court did was ignore the common 
meaning of incurring a loss or injury exactly like what happened to the Parks when their 
house burned down. Because of the "Charlotte fire" the Parks incurred the total loss of 
their home. 
There is nothing in the Safeco policy definitions or otherwise - that 
says an insured must "incur" additional expense in order to recover for an insured loss. 
Common language usage recognizes that when an insured has damage to their person or 
their property they have incurred a loss or an injury. 
"Incurring a loss" is well-recognized in the law 
That is exactly what the Idaho Supreme Court defined the tem1 "incurred" 
to mean in the context of a worker's compensation claim and an injury that "is actually 
incurred in the employer's employment." The Supreme Court noted that an injury may 
even be "incurred" before it is even manifest because an event has already taken place. 
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msurance 
The use of "incur" the context of incur a loss" is universally common 
and the law generally. Both usages are common. are a few: 
[The] claimant's injuries residual of his accident gradually 
increased in extent and severity, by reason whereof he has 
incurred physical impairment in addition to that for which he 
had been previously compensated .... 
- Nitkey v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Min. & Concentrating 
Co., 73 Idaho 294, 296, 251 P.2d 216, 217 (1952) 
* * * 
Morrison's employer required him to sign an agreement 
prepared by the University holding it harmless from any loss 
or damage he might incur due to the University's 
negligence .... 
- Morrison v. Northwest Nazarene University, 152 Idaho 
660, 661, 273 P.3d 1253, 1254 (2012) (Justice Eismann) 
* * * 
Where an injured party takes steps to mitigate the damages 
caused by another, she is entitled to the costs she reasonably 
incurs in avoiding those damages.- McCormick Intern. USA!f 
Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920, 923, 277 P.3d 367, 370 (2012) 
* * * 
Without getting into specific factual situations, it would be 
safe to conclude that the implementation of probationers' 
'voluntary' work programs sponsored by the State, could 
probably subject the State to both liability for the negligent 
actions of such volunteers, and for liability under common 
law theories for any injury that the probationer may incur 
while performing acts within the scope of such voluntary 
employment." 
- Idaho Attorney General Opinion 78-17 (3-28-78), 1978 WL 22946 
Thus, there was zero basis for the District Court to limit its definition of 
"incur" to solely incurring a debt and then leap to the conclusion that the Parks had to 
"incur a debt" to get paid for the insured loss of their home. a minimum, the policy 
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. . 
mcurnng a is at least ambiguous. i\nd is clear - because 
policies are of adhesion, not subject to negotiation between the 
parties, ambiguities must be construed most strongly against the insurer. Clark v. 
Prudential & Cas. Ins. 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242 (2003). The District 
Court erred in not so doing. 
POINT FOUR 
E COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING 
E POLICY CONTEXT OF THE WORDS 
"AS DETERMINED SHORTLY FOLLOWING THE LOSS" 
The errors of the District Court in (1) detennining that the cheaper Idaho 
Falls home was "the equivalent of' the home the Parks lost, and (2) in ruling that the 
words "incur" or "incurred" could only mean that the Parks had to go in debt for another 
home before they could collect under their policy was compounded by the District Court 
failing to read the policy in its full context. 
The Parks Safeco policy entitled the Parks to be paid "shortly following the 
loss." Not months later; and not only after they had borrowed the money to cover their 
loss. 
The Safeco Claims Manual 
The Safeco Claims Manual set forth "Safeco Service Principles" of prompt 
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the last impression we our customers with is 
settlement and payment of the claim and it is another 
moment of truth. Customers tell us that receiving prompt and 
fair payment is very important to them and has a significant 
impact in shaping how they view their claims experience and 
Safeco. You should set the proper expectations, explain the 
details of the payment and follow up to ensure the customer 
received the funds. 
- CR Safeco Depo. Ex. 11, p. Safeco Claims Manual "Claim 
Handler Assistance and Resource Tool." 
Disregard of context words "as determined shortly following the loss" 
Specifically, the District Court totally focused on the Idaho Falls house 
purchased five months after the fire and only addressed the first part of the clause in 
paragraph ( 1 )( c) while disregarded the context words "as determined shortly following the 
loss"19 from this portion of the policy: 
(1) We will pay the full cost of repair or replacement, but not 
exceeding the smallest of the following amounts: 
(a) the limit of liability under the Policy applying 
Coverage A or B; 
(b) the replacement cost of that part of the damaged 
building for equivalent construction and use on the 
19 That same tail-end modifying clause is in both subdivisions (1) (b) and (c) of the policy. 
Subdivision (b) refers to "that part" of the damaged building and was not further considered by the Court 
as the Parks' home was totaled. However, there is no reason "that part" could not also refer to the entire 
home being destroyed as it was. It is important to recognize that subdivisions (b) and ( c) are not 
counterparts where one is dealing with a partial destruction and the other with a total destruction; 
subdivision (b) is dealing with a perspective of "on the same premises" whereas subdivision ( c) is not so 
modified. 
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same premises as determined shortly following the 
loss; 
the amount actually and necessarily incurred to 
repair or replace the damaged building as determined 
shortly following the loss; 
( d) the direct financial loss you incur; or 
( e) our pro rata share of any loss when divided with 
any other valid and collectible insurance applying to 
the covered property at the time of loss.20 
The significance is that both are modified by the clause "as determined 
shortly following the loss" so it is not reasonable to read either of them as involving any 
completed new construction or other home purchase. 
The context must be considered 
In totally ignoring that "as detennined shortly following the loss" clause the 
District Court went afoul of the rule that insurance language must be read in the context 
in which it appears; the focus cannot be on some words while ignoring the rest: 
When deciding whether or not a particular provision is 
ambiguous, we must consider the provision within the context 
in which it occurs in the policy. North Pac. Ins. Co. v. Mai, 
130 Idaho 251, 939 P.2d 570 (1997) 
Pn,~l'f/u v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho 138 Idaho 443, 444, 
65 P.3d 184,185 (2003) 
* * * 
"Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of 
law over which this Court exercises fee review. When 
20 See, CR 1060; Memorandum Decision, p. 7 (4-23-15). 
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deciding whether or not a particular provision is ambiguous, 
we must consider the provision within the context in which it 
occurs in the policy" Purdy v. Farmers Ins. of Idaho, 38 
Idaho , 445-46, 65 P.3d 184, 186-87 (2003). 
- Weinstein v. Prudential Properly and Casualty Insurance, 
149 Idaho 299, 31 , 233 P.3d 1221, 1237 0) 
Because "shortly following the loss" is almost always going to be in the 
context of the loss investigation and assessment of the extent of the damage and what it 
will take to restore what was destroyed, it was not reasonable for the District Court to 
interpret subdivision ( c) as relating to the less expensive Idaho Falls house that the Parks 
bought five months later. 
"Incurred" must be read in conjunction with "shortly following the loss" 
Plaintiffs' expert, Charles Miller, explained the fact that in the insurance 
industry the combination of the word "incurred" as to a loss in conjunction with "shortly 
following the loss" would relate to repair or reconstruction bids or estimates: 
14. Safeco's obligation to the Parks was to pay replacement 
cost as limited to what the Parks incurred loss was ( or the 
insured's "financial loss") within a short time following the 
loss. The word "incurred" is not defined in the Safeco policy; 
pursuant to insurance industry standards for the 
interpretation of insurance policies it should be read to 
include repair estimates, which have not been paid. Indeed, 
that is the only reasonable reading of the incurred 
requirement, because it would not likely be possible for the 
insured to actually pay the full repair estimate shortly after 
the loss; the very purpose of insurance is to avoid that very 
thing. Further, defining "incurred" as including a repair 
estimate, such as the detailed one perfonned by Belfor 
Property Restoration, is consistent with the Safeco policy 
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definition of "Replacement cost." 
- CR Miller 4 
case Belfor Property Restoration appraisal determined what 
Parks' minimum loss was "shortly following the loss." It was error for the District Court 
ignore that modifying clause that the Parks were entitled to be paid "shortly following 
the loss." 
POINT FIVE 
CONDUCT OF SAFECO WAS BAD f AITH; 
INE QUESTIONS Of BAD FAITH AND ESTOPPEL 
DED SUMMARY JU 
At a minimum, even if Safeco' s interpretation was correct, it waived the 
very protections it seeks. 
"It is elementary that ... provisions in an insurance policy ... 
provided by the insurer for its own benefit ... may readily be 
waived by the company. And a waiver may be effected by 
conduct as well as by agreement." Lewis v. Continental Life 
& Accident Co., 93 Idaho 348, 354, 461 P.2d 243 (1969). 
Therefore, even if Safeco had utilized sufficiently clear policy language, 
which is not conceded, it waived by conduct, any requirement that the Parks must incur a 
debt before getting reimbursed. 
Safeco' s claim is inconsistent with its conduct. About a month after the 
fire, and before the home construction, Safeco voluntarily sent the Parks a check for 
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$169,000 with a notation on it Payment of: Cov[ erage] Dwelling Market 
. CR David Parks Ex. No.8004530 
conduct contradicts Safeco' s position and evidences at a minimum a waiver. And at a 
bare minimum, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to what Safeco' s true 
interpretation of the policy is. 
15. Most importantly, Safeco did not require that the Parks 
incur anything before it paid the original $169,000 amount 
based on the Jones appraisal. Safeco's argument now 
asserting that the Parks were required to "incur" a further loss 
before Safeco was obligated to make full payment turns the 
very purpose of insurance on its head by requiring an insured 
to first pay for the very loss sustained and insured against 
before receiving payment from the insurer. That is contrary to 
the policy, Safeco's annual representations to the Parks, 
Safeco's conduct here and any insured's reasonable 
expectations in the same circumstances. 
- CR 943; Mmer Declaration, p. ,r 15 {ea) 
However, it may also indicate knowing conduct on the part of Safeco to 
voluntarily pay a loss, and only later when their appraisal is shown to be facially 
deficient, claim that any real reimbursement will come only after the insured has incurred 
out-of-pocket loss - which is not expressly required by the policy. This second potential 
scenario raises the specter of bad faith conduct an intentional denial or withholding of 
payment, where the claim was not fairly debatable, and the denial or failure to pay was 
not the result of a good faith mistake. See, Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
137 Idaho 173, 176, 45 P.3d 829 (2002). 
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The bottom line is that at a minimum there is a waiver of the very condition 
this case. 
POINT SIX 
E ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
I CODE §41 839(1) 
The Parks request this Court's award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1), on the basis that Safeco has not paid the amount justly due. 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1) states: 
"Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of 
insurance, surety, guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature 
whatsoever that fails to pay a person entitled thereto within 
thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as 
provided in such policy, certificate or contract, or to pay to the 
person entitled thereto within sixty ( 60) days if the proof of 
loss pertains to uninsured motorist or underinsured motorist 
coverage benefits, the amount that person is justly due under 
such policy, certificate or contract shall in any action 
thereafter commenced against the insurer in any court in this 
state , or in any arbitration for recovery under the terms of the 
policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount as the 
court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action 
or arbitration." 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1) also applies on appeal. See Cherry v. Coregis 
Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 882,888,204 P.3d 522, 528 (2009); Cranney v. Mutual of Enumclaw 
Ins. Co., 45 Idaho 6, 9, 175 P.3d 168, 1711 (2007). 
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did not honor duty the Parks. The Parks had been loyal 
insureds of Safeco for 18 years. Each of those 18 years Safeco urged them to increase the 
coverage on their home so it was insured for its complete value. Every year the Parks 
accepted Safeco's valuation and correspondingly paid Safeco the increased premium. 
The homeowners policy Safeco sold the Parks concluded with two pages 
that were titled "Ask yourself: Do you have enough insurance coverage?" and "Let's 
make sure you're fully insured." The last two lines of the last page of the Safeco policy 
ended with "Of course, we hope you'll never need these services. But we'll all sleep 
better knowing you're fully insured. Thank you for trusting Safeco with your home 
insurance needs." CR 304-305; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 48-49. 
The Parks did "trust" Safeco. They trusted Safeco with the annual home 
value recommendations of "enough insurance coverage" and they paid the increased 
annual premium that went along with those annual recommendations. The Parks trusted 
Safeco to be honorable with them and give them insurance for which they had faithfully 
paid the premium for 18 years. 
The "Charlotte fire" of June 28, 2012 that destroyed the Parks' quality 
home and 65 others in Pocatello put the Parks in the position of needing to trust Safeco 
to take care of them. What they got from Safeco was not worthy of trust. 
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What the Parks got from Safeco was a pronouncement that Safeco would 
require the Parks to borrow money to get another home before Safeco would pay 
Safeco was not providing "insurance" in any sense of the word that allowed the Parks to 
"sleep better knowing you're fully insured" as Safeco promised. Safeco had the Parks 
"over the barrel" and was content to take advantage. 
The District Court committed error in taking a pro-Safeco interpretation of 
the Parks' policy that ignored the full tenns and context of the policy ""Loss Settlement" 
provisions. Summary judgment in favor of Safeco should be reversed with entry of 
Judgment for the Parks for the full insured valuation of the Parks' home that Safeco had 
asserted and accepted and the case remanded for trial against Safeco on bad faith. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of November, 2015 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of October, 2015 I mailed two copies of 
foregoing to Robert A. Anderson and Mark D. Sebastian of Anderson, Julian & Hull, 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700, Boise, ID 83707-7426; FAX 208-344-5510. 
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